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Abstract
In the cyber domain, network defenders have traditionally been placed in a reactionary
role. Before a defender can act they must wait for an attack to occur and identify the
attack. This places the defender at a disadvantage in a cyber attack situation and it is
certainly desirable that the defender out maneuver the attacker before the network has
been compromised. The goal of this research is to determine the value of employing
a recommender system as an attack predictor, and determine the best configuration of a
recommender system for the cyber defense domain. The most important contribution of
this research effort is the use of recommender systems to generate an ordered list of cyber
defense actions.
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A RECOMMENDER SYSTEM IN THE CYBER DEFENSE DOMAIN
I. Introduction
1.1 Overview
In the cyber domain, network defenders have traditionally been placed in a reactionary
role. Before a defender can act they must wait for an attack to occur and identify the
attack. Clearly this places the defender at a disadvantage in a cyber attack situation and
it is desirable that the defender outmaneuver the attacker before the network has been
compromised. The defender must have some insight into how the attacker will execute
their attack to close off that attack vector. Attack predictors provide that information to the
defender by analysis of current known attack methods, the state of the network, and the
previous actions of the attacker.
1.2 Problem Statement
The Air Force relies on the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the network
in order to function. Cyber defense has become a major concern for the Air Force. The
cyber defense domain has been accepted by the Air Force as another domain in which
we fight. Therefore, it is reasonable to apply conventional warfare strategic methods
to cyber defense. John Boyd’s OODA loop, shown in Figure 1.1, aligns with current
cyber defense practices. In order to develop better cyber defense systems new approaches
are being explored applying concepts from other domains. In this research effort, the
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) functions as the Observe and Orient aspect of the OODA
loop. Using recommender system techniques that have previously been used for helping
customers find products of interest, a new decision making technique can be used for a
1
cyber defense system. The human cyber defender performs the action step [2]. The IDS
and recommender system augment the human by providing increased situational awareness
and ranked recommendations for actions.
Figure 1.1: John Boyd’s OODA loop
Cyber attacks occur in stages (1) Information Gathering, (2) Scanning and Vulnera-
bility Assessment, (3) Intrusion, (4) Maintaining Access, and (5) Clearing Tracks. Under-
standing and anticipating the actions of the attack gives the cyber defender their opportunity
to overcome the advantages of the attacker. The cyber defender must create a faster OODA
loop process in order to out maneuver the attacker. The time between the start of the attack
and the counter action taken by the cyber defender must occur on the order of seconds.
Many cyber attacks often strike quickly, before the defender can counter the attack.
1.3 Goals and Approach
This research effort focuses on speeding up the defender’s OODA loop, specifically
the decision aspect. Already research has been done to create efficient IDS. In order to aid
the cyber defender in making their decision a recommender system can be implemented
to provide recommended actions. Recommender systems have commonly been used to
suggest items of interest to consumers. For example, Netflix uses a recommender system
2
to suggest movies for users to watch. Netflix takes in information about what movies the
user enjoys by asking them to rate movies on a 1 to 5 scale and what types of movies the
user enjoys based on genre. The exact algorithm implemented by Netflix is proprietary, but
it is easy to understand that if you give Die Another Day a high rating and enter that you
enjoy action spy movies that the algorithm would suggest other James Bond films. The
recommender system behind that decision uses large matrices that predict the rating a user
would give to a movie based on the information they have gathered about that user.
The recommender system uses the information about the network from the IDS
to predict the likelihood of certain events for particular nodes on the network. The
recommender system then presents a ranked list of actions to the cyber defender with the
highest ranked action mitigating the most events which have been predicted to occur. By
giving a cyber defender a list of recommended defensive actions they are able to chose
which action best suites their specific network. The recommender system is meant to
enhance human cyber defenders.
1.4 Contribution
Many different attack predictors have been created in the past. Previous attack
predictors present the cyber defender with a prediction of the attackers next action. The
recommender system is an attack predictor, but taken to the next level by presenting the
cyber defender with how to counter act the predicted action. Recommender systems have
been used extensively in the domain of recommending items to customers but have not been
applied to the cyber defense domain. The insight supplied by a recommender system holds
great potential for acting as recommending defensive cyber actions. No one has taken a
purely recommender system algorithm and implemented it to recommender cyber defense
actions.
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1.5 Summary
Cyber defense is a technical issue that concerns all organizations which rely on
networks to function. Appropriately and quickly reacting to cyber attacks is the main
option for today’s cyber defender. The implementation of a recommender system as a
cyber defense decision making tool is an area that merits being explored. Recommender
systems have been studied for decades, but only in their original domain of retail customer
suggestions. The same algorithms and techniques could have value for other domains.
4
II. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
The four main types of recommender systems include collaborative, content-based,
knowledge-based, and hybrid. In this chapter the background of each type of recommender
system will be explored. Recommender systems are often used in the world of customer
buying preferences. The suggestions made by recommender systems are a form of Artificial
Intelligence (AI) which makes predictions based on previous actions of the customer,
knowledge of the problem domain, or survey of customer preferences. The majority of
the literature approaches recommender systems within the problem domain of suggesting
items to a customer.
2.2 Collaborative
The actions of existing users form the foundation of collaborative filtering for
recommendations. The system observes the actions of a new user and compares them with
the actions of existing users in order to find their nearest neighbor. Creating a suggestion
uses the ratings or actions of a previous user as a predictor for future actions of the new
user. Most collaborative filtering techniques employ a user-item matrix in order to generate
preferences for a user. A user-item matrix is shown in Figure 2.1. Collaborative systems
were first created in the 1990’s and since then their capabilities have been thoroughly
explored [10]. But the majority of these research efforts have been confined to the domain
of customer purchases [15].
One of the most common methods to calculate a rating is the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient. It assigns pairs of users a value from -1 to +1, with +1 being a very strong
positive correlation and a -1 is a very strong negative correlation. Users with high positive
correlation values are very similar in the items that they bought. Using the basic assumption
5
Figure 2.1: User-Item Matrix
for collaborative recommender systems, it follows that highly correlated users will be
interested in similar items. The items bought by one similar user and not by the other
should be recommended. The prediction value for the item is calculated based on how
close that neighbor is to the user’s average rating [15]. Pearson’s correlation coefficient
is one way to calculate similarity between users shown in Equation (2.1). The values are
summed for each item i from the set of all items I. The symbol ra,i is the rating for item i
by user a and the symbol ra is the average rating for user a.
similarity(a, b) =
∑
i∈I(ra,i − ra)(rb,i − ri)√∑
i∈I(ra,i − ra)2
√∑
i∈I(rb,i − rb)2
(2.1)
The concept that users will buy similar items to the items they have showed an
interest in and avoid items that they have no interest in drives item-based recommendation.
Item-based systems take input as a user-item matrix to determine relationships between
different items. Scalability is a challenge for user-based systems. When the user-item
matrix becomes very large, the matrix computations become time-consuming [25].
Analyzing the interaction of items generates a recommendation for a user. Item-based
algorithms outperform user-based algorithms, because the relationship between items is
more stable than the relationship between users. With a more stable relationship the time
consuming task of computation can be performed oﬄine while still supplying accurate
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predictions [25]. Using the similarity value calculated from the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient and the N nearest neighbor a predicted rating can be calculated, shown in
Equation (2.2).
prediction(a, i) = ra +
∑
b∈N similarity(a, b) ∗ (rb,i − rb)∑
b∈N similarity(a, b)
(2.2)
Real world data sets often lack large amounts of information which results in a
problem known as sparsity. Without enough information it is difficult to make accurate
recommendations for users. A similar problem, known as cold start, occurs when a new
user has only rated a few items and there is not enough ratings in the matrix to make good
predictions. Cold start also happens when there is a high item to user ratio, meaning that
it is difficult for the user to rate a large enough number of items for the recommender to
be able to make meaningful predictions [20]. Both problems stem from the difficulty in
matching a user with few ratings to similar neighbors. A pure collaborative approach is
to turn the matrix information into a graph and use a technique called spreading activation
to find relationships between users and items. The recommendations are based on how
close an item is from a user in the graph where distance is the number of edges from the
item to the user [12]. Another method uses probability and similar user ratings to generate
suggestions. By exploiting the information that does exist for the user the accuracy of
predictions improve [29]. The most straight-forward solution is to use a hybrid system
which gains insight into the recommendation using other sources of information such as
item attributes or demographic information.
2.3 Content-based
Content-based recommendation uses information about items and past actions of users
in order to make predictions. The thought process behind content-based recommenders
is that a user will buy future items which are similar to items they have bought in the
past. In order to determine the similarity of items certain attributes or features must be
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associated with those items. Collecting the attributes about items, especially if the attributes
are qualitative, can be a difficult task. When an item lacks information it falls into a similar
issue of sparsity as found in collaborative recommendations. Content-based recommenders
do not need the large number of users or ratings of items by a user that collaborative
recommender systems demand, but must have item information.
Content-based recommendation not only uses the meta-data of features, but also the
actual content of documents. A vector is constructed using a 1 to represent if a word
is contained in a document and a 0 when the word is absent. Then the recommender
system compares the vector with other documents. The process is simple, but there are
many issues to this basic approach. The vector favors longer documents and does not
take into consideration the significance and frequency of the words in the document [15].
To overcome these issues documents are analyzed using the Term Frequency-Inverse
Document Frequence (TF-IDF) technique. Term frequency takes into account how often
a word appears in a document. Inverse document frequency helps to highlight the
difference between documents by giving higher weight to words which only appear in that
document [24].
To determine if an item would be of interest to a user, the recommender system needs
to have information of items that were previously of interest to the user and the similarity
between potential items. The recommender system tracks items the user found useful and
gathers a rating for items. The recommender system collects items into neighborhoods
using a similarity calculation. Each item the user bought, associated with a particular
neighborhood, counts as a vote for that neighborhood. If k of the nearest neighbors
were rated highly by the user, then that item should be recommended. In order to create
neighborhoods new items are compared to current items in the inventory taking into account
attributes and similar terms. Long-term profiles of users can be kept and analyzed in
order to give the best recommendation [1]. Short-term profiles can be used when a user
8
has frequent changes of interest. The k-nearest-neighbor technique is straightforward,
adaptable, and requires little data in order to give a good recommendation [15].
Content-based recommender systems perform well with many items and users, but
there are some issues when implementing a system. The information that can be associated
with items limits the abilities of content-based recommender systems. With text based
items, such as documents, news articles, and websites, recommender systems simply
analyze the words, but this neglects other attributes of items which are more subjective.
Features are difficult to extract when items are not text based. Manual entry of attributes
requires too high of a cost to be a viable solution. With few attributes for items,
content-based recommender systems suffer from their own form of sparsity. Content-based
recommenders focus on suggesting similar items to previous items of interest, but they can
begin to make suggestions which are too similar. A user is not interested in buying an item
if they already bought the item from a different company. To provide interesting by not
too similar items some diversity can be introduced to the system or a filter can be used
to eliminate items which are too similar [31]. Lastly, the cold start problem does effect
content-based recommender systems, but not as severely as collaborative recommender
systems. The content-based recommender requires only a few ratings or past action
information in order to make a prediction, unlike collaborative systems which require
mostly complete user-item matrix [15].
2.4 Knowledge-based
Knowledge-based recommendations do not require user-item data to make recom-
mendations for users. Instead knowledge-based recommenders use explicit rules about
the problem domain and attributes of items to generate predictions for users. Knowledge-
based recommender systems interact more intimately with users. Unlike collaborative and
content-based recommendations which track user actions and collect ratings, knowledge-
based recommendations collect specific requirements from the user in order to bring them
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closer to items of interest. Therefore, with items that are not bought often, knowledge-
based recommenders can direct a user to an item without dealing with sparsity issues [3].
Constraint-based recommenders perform recommendations as a solution to a con-
straint satisfaction problem. By using the requirements given by a user as the constraints,
the attributes of products are compared in order to find items which are within the given
parameters [9]. A simple constraint solver is capable of finding items which satisfy the
requirements supplied by the user. Another way to perform constraint-based recommenda-
tions is to execute a conjunctive query over the database of items. The system constructs a
conjunctive query by connecting together the requirements for attributes given by the user,
then performs a database query which returns items which meet the constraints. Both con-
junctive query and constraint satisfaction solvers view the requirements from the user as
constraints, categorizing them as constraint-based recommenders.
Case-based recommendations are made from the similarities between items and the
requirements. McSherry defines a distance similarity for an item depending on the sum
of all the similarities of attributes weighted by the requirements. Other items are of
interest purely dependent on how far an attribute is from the given requirement. To find
similar items local similarity can be calculated based on the distance of the attribute
of the item from the desired attribute divided by the total range of the attribute [19].
Usually, the similarity calculations for case-based recommendations are used as an aspect
of utility-based recommender systems. Other case-based recommenders rely on a more
query-based paradigm. A purely query-based system can be very difficult if the user does
not have specific requirements. A different form of query-based recommendation guides
users to explore the space and give incremental critiquing in order to key into items of
interest. The user gives adjustments to the requirements throughout the search in response
to the items recommended to the user [3]. Both types of case-based recommendations
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depend heavily on finding items which do not fulfill all the requirements of a user, but
instead offer items which are close to the desired traits.
Utility-based recommender systems find the overall utility of an item for a user after
gathering the weight or interest level the user has in a particular attribute. The weight can
also be determined by the system which significantly decreases the load on the user. The
total utility is calculated as the sum of all the item values, which is the weight multiplied
by the similarity function used in case-based recommendations. The result is a ranking of
items based on how similar the items are to the requirements set by the user [19].
Often knowledge-based recommenders are unable to satisfy all the requirements given
by a user. Instead of providing a null response the recommender system should guide the
user or automatically relax the constraints. By incrementally relaxing the constraints the
recommender system can find an item which is close to meeting the original requirements.
Another method is to identify conflicts between the requirements and potential items. Using
a divide-and-conquer algorithm QuickXPlain finds conflicts for given constraints [16].
After determining constraints that cannot be satisfied the recommender system must
suggest ways to repair requirements so that they can be met by the available items.
2.5 Hybrid
Hybrid recommender systems attempt to exploit the strengths of each of the three
main types of recommender systems. By pooling information from different approaches a
better representation of the problem can be created. The algorithms implemented and the
method of hybridization factor into the results. The algorithm’s solutions can be combined
at the end of separate calculations or the results of one algorithm can feed into the input of
a second algorithm [15].
Both collaborative and content-based recommenders share the problem of sparsity,
which makes them more suited for problems with a high density of information.
Knowledge-based recommenders do not suffer from sparsity, because the focus is
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more on the problem domain than the people or items in the domain. Unfortunately,
knowledge-based recommenders are not capable of developing associations between
users and items, but instead function based on their understanding of the problem
domain [4]. Because of the dependence on users and items, collaborative and content-based
recommenders can react and learn as the needs of users change. Collaborative techniques
function well in domains where content-based techniques suffer, such as situations with few
attributes for items or where attributes of items are difficult for a machine to analyze [20].
Content-based recommendations require very few user-item ratings to make accurate
recommendations.
Weighted hybrid recommender systems perform multiple techniques on the same set
of data. Then post computation combines the information from the various techniques
in order to present the overall recommendations. Static weights must be able to give
valid results for all possible combinations. Some weighted hybrids adjust weights
depending on the shifting situation. Specifically, the P-Tango system employs a hybrid
recommender which adjusts the weights for each technique in order to find the most
accurate recommendation [6]. As users give feedback in the form of rating, the weights
are altered to reflect the best recommendations for users. A weighted hybrid recommender
attempts to balance the strengths and weakness of many different techniques by simply
giving a weighted value to the output.
A switching hybrid determines the best technique to use in a given situation and uses
that to compute a recommendation. The recommender determines which technique to
execute based on the user-item matrix and the acceptability of the technique’s results [15].
Sparsity could be addressed by using a knowledge-based recommender with new items,
then once enough users have bought or rated the item collaborative recommendation would
be chosen. Some switching hybrids function based on a default and only employ other
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techniques when the default fails to give a valid result [27]. The decision of when to switch
can also be based on a probability which is determined by the quality of the prediction [4].
Feature combination combines collaborative and content-based recommendations in
another way to address the issue of sparsity. The collaborative results are used merely as an
additional feature for an item. The hybrid recommender relies mostly on content-based, but
does not lose the information that collaborative recommendations capture. Content-based
recommenders often cannot identify the connections between items which are not explicit
attributes, but that a collaborative recommendation would uncover because of the actions
of users [4]. Implementation of knowledge-based recommenders with another technique
using feature combination has not been widely explored [15], but may lead to a better
solution to the problem of sparsity.
Instead of running different recommendation techniques in parallel then combining
the output, cascade uses the output of one recommendation as the input for a different
technique. One combination uses a knowledge-based recommendation to sort the items
into different categories, then the second technique is applied to the items within each
category to give a more complete recommendation. Certain categories could be ignored
for the second search, if they are infeasible. For large data sets it could be very useful to
remove infeasible items from the pool, but in contrast it may not return enough items to be
useful. The second technique for a cascade recommender could simply be used to break ties
for the results of the first technique [4]. Cascaded hybrid recommenders prioritize items
and then aggregate the items into an overall recommendation.
Feature augmentation allows a different recommendation technique to refine the
results of the main technique. The first technique alters the attributes for the item input
before the second technique is applied. For example, in the content-boosted collaborative
filtering created by Melville et al. sparsity and first-rater problem are overcome using
both content and collaborative techniques [20]. They use a content recommender to create
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pseudo user-ratings for items the user has not rated, then simply apply a collaborative
recommender using the Pearson correlation. The content recommender was used to
enhance the ability of the collaborative results.
By combining different methods of recommendation weaknesses in certain techniques
can be mitigated. Because both collaborative and content-based recommenders suffer from
the sparsity problem it may be redundant to use a hybrid of those two techniques. Generally,
using a knowledge-based recommender is good for countering the sparsity problem. The
order in which certain hybrid methods are implemented impact the outcome. For example,
feature combination using a collaborative then a content-based would be very different than
using a content-based then a collaborative recommender. Hybrid recommender systems
exploit the strengths of other recommendation methods by finding a balance between
different techniques.
2.6 Attack Predictors
The recommender system is used to anticipate the actions of an attacker and suggest
a course of action to mitigate the degradation of the network capabilities. Understanding
current methods to predict attacker actions plays a key role.
2.6.1 Attack Graphs.
Attack graphs create a Bayesian representation of attacker actions which can be
performed to compromise the network. Defenders use attack graphs to increase their
situational awareness of vulnerabilities in the network. By anticipating attacker course
of action a defender can counter the attacker before the attack exploits the network.
The ADversary-driven VIew Security Evaluation (ADVISE) method developed by
Lemay et al. analyzes attack graphs and returns results applicable to the specific attacker. In
order to answer a decision question about the network security a discrete event simulation
is run on a modeled system. The attacker is characterized from the utility of their attack,
the skill level the attacker is capable of executing, goal of the attacker, system knowledge,
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and system access. The utility of potential attacks are calculated based on the cost for
the adversary, reward for the adversary, probability of a successful attack, and probability
of the adversary of being detected during the attack. Attacks are represented in different
states in a graph where each step of an attack is a different state. The system performs
the analysis based on a simulation which is only a representation of the actual system. In
a simulation only well understood attacks can be analyzed. The system does take many
attacker characteristics into consideration. Overall, ADVISE performs a comprehensive
analysis, but does not have the capability for analyzing complex systems [17].
The causal network developed by Qin and Lee takes attack graphs to the next level.
The approach has a more strategic level view which attempts to determine the goals and
intensions of the attacker. The system first correlates all the alerts clustering them into
attacks. Then the alerts are sorted based on priority. The priority is calculated taking
into account the defender’s mission objectives, and the severity of the attack. Using
Bayesian techniques the probability of different attacks are determined with consideration
for the configuration of the network. Additionally, statistical analysis is applied to find
relationships between alerts. Applying the alert information to the creation of the attack
graph forms an attack tree with branches including possible intrusions. The attack tree is
used to create a causal network with each node with a given probability. An example of
an attack graph in Figure 2.2 generated from an attack tree in Figure 2.3. Each node has
a binary value which updates as more alerts occur in the network. The Bayesian network
supplies the attack prediction for the defense network. Using the data set from DARPA’s
Grand Challenge Problem, the system was able to predict the correct attacker action and
goal. The major goal of this effort was to develop a systematic way to generate attack plan
graphs based on alerts from the network. Cyber defense has begun to shift in the direction
of understanding the strategic objectives of the attacker. The system created by Qin and Lee
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accomplishes that task simply by analyzing intrusion alerts. By learning the objective of the
attacker, the cyber defender gains a clear advantage when choosing defensive actions [22].
Figure 2.2: Attack Graph [22]
For attack graphs to be practical they must scale well. The NetSPA system uses
a new type of attack graph called the multiple-prerequisite graph which enables it to
linearly increase to the size of any network. The system has significant capabilities
such as creating an attack graph to represent the attacker’s ability to maximally intrude
into the network, model attackers from different locations in the network, and quickly
builds the multiple-prerequisite graph. The multiple-prerequisite graphs forms a graphical
representation of an attacker’s possible sequence of actions to compromise the network.
An example of a multiple-prerequisite graph is shown in Figure 2.4. Information about
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Figure 2.3: Attack Tree [22]
the vulnerability of the network is gathered through Nessus scans, system configuration
data, and reachability calculations. The vulnerability information feeds into the NetSPA
algorithm which using a breadth-first search forms the multiple-prerequisite graph. In
order to deal with scalability the system consolidates similar states and groups of nodes
behind bottlenecks. Recommendations are computed based on the key vulnerabilities
which allow the attacker to progress through the attack. Testing of the NetSPA system
was done with a simulation of 50,000 nodes and a field test of 250 nodes. For the field test,
the attack graph was generated in a matter of 0.5 seconds, but was too large for a person
to understand quickly. The system’s recommendations were more useful with such a large
graph. NetSPA is one of the few systems which addresses the issue of scaling and presents
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recommendations for the defender instead of just predicting the next attack; which makes
it more practical for use in a real network [13].
Figure 2.4: Example of (a) Full Graph, (b) Predictive Graph, and (c) Multiple-Prerequisite
Graph [13]
2.6.2 Attack Trees.
Attack trees present a goal oriented attack with a multi-level graph. Attack trees
represent similar information to attack graphs in either an outlined textual format or
a graphical format with nodes, edges, and dependencies. Attack trees have additional
conditions of AND and OR for parent-child node relationships. Because of the distribution
and dependency, attack graphs which are analyzed using Bayesian techniques are not
possible. Therefore, other methods must be used for analysis of attack trees.
The framework that Daley et al. developed uses modified attack trees. The nodes in
the attack tree follow a certain classification called Stratified Node Topology (SNT). The
SNT labels nodes based on functionality, including application exploits, abstract attacks,
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and attack goals. The graph has both implicit and explicit edges which represent an
indirect and direct connection to other exploits respectively. An example of SNT is show in
Figure 2.5. The attack trees are constructed in reference to specific host vulnerabilities on
the network. The SNT forms the framework for analysis of attacks. No specific technique
for determining likely attacks has been developed for the framework. SNT does present
the potential cyber attacks in a step by step format which enables the defender to observe
possible attack vectors [7].
Figure 2.5: Example of Stratified Node Topology [7]
The network is represented by a logical model which includes the system configura-
tion, vulnerabilities, and potential attackers. The nodes on the cyber terrain graph represent
hosts and include specific services and data metrics. The value of the node is represented
by a utility given to each service and data metric assigned 0 to 1, with 1 representing a
high valued service or data. A service tree is generated which maps vulnerabilities, alerts,
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and privilege levels to specific services on the network. The edges of the terrain graph
include an access and band list. The behavior prediction process begins with filtering the
IDS alerts. Next a probability model is built based on the observed alerts using the finite
context model previously constructed from network analysis. Different orders of probabili-
ties, which are different levels of depth, are created with the blending of these orders called
Variable Length Markov Model (VLMM). Testing of the VLMM system was performed
on a virtual network with scripted attacks. The VLMM significantly outperformed the in-
dividual orders of probability with a 90% accuracy rate. The cyber terrain and VLMM
system take two very different approaches to predicting cyber attackers but provide a good
representation of an attacker’s possible behavior [8].
Yang et al. have designed a cyber fusion engine called INformation Fusion Engine
for Real-time Decision-making (INFERD) and Threat Assessment for Network Data and
Information (TANDI) to predict stages of a multi-state cyber attack. INFERD performs the
IDS alert correlation while TANDI determines threats to the network based on the output
from INFERD and network configuration. As alerts are generated on the network INFERD
associates each alert with an existing attack, then updates the severity of each on-going
attack. Influencing the decisions of both INFERD and TANDI is the Guidance Template
which is viewed as the expert for attacker modeling. TANDI determines threat levels taking
into account hacker’s goals, vulnerabilities, value of the target, and skill of the attacker.
The threat assessment algorithm weighs the information and determines likely targets for
the next attack. The system is limited by not being able to observe insider threats and being
unable to correlate coordinated attacks from different sources. INFERD was tested on a
virtual network by Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), while a set of cyber attacks
were designed by the researchers to test TANDI. Both demonstrated good performance,
but with limitations for understanding multi-stage cyber attacks. Both systems are limited
in their knowledge of possible attacker actions by the Guidance Template, which must be
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created by someone with domain knowledge. Because of the dependence on the Guidance
Template the system has limited adaptability [30].
2.6.3 Machine Learning.
Machine learning encompasses a wide range of techniques which focus on presenting
the system with information and enabling the system to incorporate this information to
make future decisions. The tools included in this section did not fit into the previous
categories; therefore they are included in the wider discipline of machine learning.
Exploiting the knowledge about the previous actions of an attacker is a common
approach. The tool called Nexat uses machine learning techniques to predict the actions of
attackers on a cyber network. Nexat executes in phases starting with data extraction phases
where attack sessions from the IDS are placed in hash tables. Then the training phase is
performed which creates sets of targets with associated probability. The training phase is
followed by the prediction phase where Nexat uses the probabilities and weighted sums to
determine the most likely next attack. The Nexat tool was evaluated using a dataset from
a cyber competition and it performed with over a 94% average accuracy. Nexat requires
a workload to train and is limited in its knowledge based on the training. With a good
training dataset the system performs well and is able to scale to any size network [5].
Another technique was developed by Ning et al. to compute the strategy of an attack
based on the IDS alerts triggered by the attack. The technique is based upon an attack
strategy graph with nodes representing attacks, and edges representing order of attacks.
Using a subgraph isomorphic method the similarity to other attacks based on the IDS
alerts can be calculated. A correlation model is built from the IDS alerts, which shows
the dependencies of different attack vectors. The system is able to identify the attack
strategy when the IDS alerts are generalized and computes the similarity between different
attacks. The information obtained for the cyber defender gives them a strategic view on
the cyber attack, but little practical information. Understanding the goals of the cyber
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attacker is important, but understanding exactly what vulnerabilities will be exploited is
more valuable [21].
2.7 Summary
Recommender systems process large martices of information in order to make
predictions. A wide range of methods can be used to obtain a utility of an item for a
user. Collaborative recommenders focus on grouping similar users, while content-based
recommenders create neighborhoods from the attributes of items. Knowledge-based
recommenders extract information from users then through relaxing requirements arrive
at a recommendation. Hybrid recommenders bring the other three techniques together
in order to create a well-rounded recommender. Each recommender must be carefully
designed to fit their specific problem domain.
The current methods for attack predictors: attack graphs, attack trees, and machine
learning, are well developed. The major problem with using current methods of network
analysis centers on scalability. A large network with many nodes makes the nodal model
very complex. The information presented to the network defender is overwhelming. Many
of the systems attempt to present the information in such a way as to aid the defender.
But these systems fall short compared to the capability of a recommender system, which
focuses on making meaningful suggestions to a user. The majority of the work in predicting
attacks has been with the goal of improving predictions. Knowing the next action of the
cyber attacker is useful but only if the defender knows how best to counteract the attacker.
A recommender system would be a more complete tool for the defender and holds the
possibility to act autonomously.
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III. Recommender System Design
3.1 Overview
In this chapter the design of the recommender system and IDS are explained. The
IDS used in this experiment was designed by Captain Evan Raulerson. In the context of
the Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA) loop the IDS functions as the Observe and Orient
while the recommender system functions as the Decide. Finally, the Action part of the
OODA loop is performed by the cyber defender and has the potential to be automated.
3.2 Network Model
The Network Modeler functions as an IDS from the perspective of the recommender
system, but it gives significantly more information about the network than the average
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software. For the purpose of simplicity when referring
to the Network Modeler of the experimental system it will be called an IDS. The IDS has
three major sections: sensors, database, and modeler algorithm. The sensors are located on
each node of the network and send updates to the database. The modeler pulls information
from the database to classify the information. The database and COTS software run on the
sensor machine
3.2.1 Sensors.
There are a variety of types of sensors used to collect information about the network
status. To understand the overall network health the sensors view the network from different
aspects. Almost all of the sensors are COTS with the exception of the host monitoring
which was custom written. The creator of the IDS intended to use only COTS, because of
the availability and known success, but a compatible host monitoring system could not be
found for the scope of the IDS. Snort is used to observe the network traffic and alert to
known signatures of attacks. The rule set for snort is customized for the attacks that will be
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executing on the network to ensure that an alert is generated. The Snort rules in Figure 3.1
was designed to alert to the netbios smb buffer overflow exploit. Another tool observing
alert tcp any any -> \$HOME_NET 445 (msg:"’ET NETBIOS Microsoft
Windows NETAPI Stack Overflow Inbound - MS08-067 (15)"’;
flow:established,to_server; content:"’|1F 00|"’; content:"’|C8 4F
32 4B7016 D3 01 12 78 5A 47 BF 6E E1 88|"’; content "‘|00 2E 00 2E
5C 00 2E 00 2E 00 5C|"’; reference: url, www.microsoft.com/technet/
security/Bulletin/MS08-067.mspx; reference:cve, 2008-4250;
reference: url, ww.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/827267; reference:url,
doc.emerginingthreats.net/bin/view/Main/2008705; classtype:
attempted-admin; sid:2008705; rev:5;)
Figure 3.1: Custom Snort rule [23]
the network is Nmap. Nmap scans the network to find hosts and determines the services
running on that host. The information gathered from Nmap is stored in the database on the
sensor machine using Perl scripts. The custom host monitoring software is a java based
program sending updates to the database on the sensor machine. The host monitoring
program gathers information about memory usage, CPU usage, bandwidth, and service
information. Additionally, the host monitoring program controls the anti-virus software for
each host. The anti-virus software used is AVG Anti-Virus 2013, because of the ease to
send commands and receive information through the command line [23].
3.2.2 Database.
A MySQL database located on the sensor machine acts as the storage for the sensors
on the network. Snort, Nmap, vulnerability scores, and host monitoring software are
the four databases used to store the information. The database acts as the collection of
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information about the network as shown in Figure 3.2. The Snort database is created during
the Snort installation. The event table includes the key information for alerts with the
signature identifier, and timestamp. The other tables in the Snort database store signature
identifiers and specific information about events with foreign keys to the event table. The
Nmap database includes two tables: machines and services. The machines table stores
information about specific machines on the network such as Operating System (OS), and
Internet Protocol (IP) address. The services table stores data about services running on each
machine. The host monitoring database is where the host monitoring program running on
each machines sends the updates of the node’s status and anti-virus software results. The
vulnerability scores database stores the requirements for the host to meet in order to be
vulnerable to attacks found in the Snort alerts [23].
Figure 3.2: Flow of the IDS Information [23]
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3.2.3 Modeler Algorithm.
The network modeler collects and classifies the information about the network in order
to build a better understanding of network health. The classification and assessment aspect
determines if there is a threat to the network based on the information gathered from all
of the sensors on the network. The flow of the modeler is summarized in Figure 3.3.
The designer of the IDS created his own scale and requirements to determine the level
of vulnerability for the network and labeled events based off of the ranking system. For
the purposes of the recommender system testing the vulnerability threat level assigned by
the IDS will not be considered. Another valuable contribution to the network picture
Figure 3.3: Data Fusion of the Modeler [23]
is the generation of possible actions that can be taken on each host using administrative
privileges. The modeler does not include an exhaustive list of all possible actions, but
functions as a demonstration of the capability of the modeler to perform such an action.
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With such a functionally built into the system it is possible to expand to a more complete
list of possible actions to be taken on the network. Actions are assigned to hosts based on
known actions in the database and the host information gathered. The list of actions are
shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. Actions are included on this list with no regard to what
is occurring in the network. Instead the modeler provides all actions that can be taken in
order to provide the cyber defender the option to react as they deem appropriate [23].
Table 3.1: List of basic actions that can be taken on client machines [23]
Action
Update operating system
Update application
Create user account
Delete user account
Reset user password
Disable port/service
Enable port/service
Table 3.2: List of basic actions that can be taken on the firewall machine [23]
Action
Block source IP address
Allow source IP address
Block destination IP address
Allow destination IP address
Block ICMP traffic
Allow ICMP traffic
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3.2.4 Output.
The output from the modeling algorithm is an XML file which summarizes the
network health. Each host on the network has information about services running on the
host, user accounts, infections, and actions that can be taken for that host. The XML file
includes the information for all the hosts on the network. The tags used in the XML file are
show in Figure 3.4. The host will only have tags for events associated with that individual
host. For example only a host which is acting as a firewall will have firewall rules and only
a host with an infection detected from the anti-virus will have the infection tag [23].
<network>
<host>
[attributes]
<service>[attributes]</service>
<user>[attributes]</user>
<event>[attributes]</event>
<av_scan>
[attributes]
<infection>[attributes]</infection>
</av_scan>
<action>[attributes]</action>
<firewall_rule>[attribute]</firewall_rule>
</host>
</network>
Figure 3.4: Format example of XML file output from network modeler [23]
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3.3 Collaborative Recommender System
The collaborative recommender system functions as the attack predictor. The
algorithm is the user-based nearest neighbor recommendation. First the similarity between
the nodes is calculated with the nodes replacing user and the attributes for each node
replacing the products. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient assigns similarity values from
−1, strong negative correlation, to +1, strong positive correlation. For each pair of nodes
the similarity is calculated using Equation (3.1) [15].
similarity(a, b) =
∑
i∈I(ra,i − ra)(rb,i − ri)√∑
i∈I(ra,i − ra)2
√∑
i∈I(rb,i − rb)2
(3.1)
For example, the output from the modeler shown in Table 3.3 results in the similarity shown
in Table 3.4. The prediction is calculated using the similarity values. Based on pilot studies,
five nearest neighbors were selected for the algorithms. The predicted value is found using
Equation (3.2) [15].
Table 3.3: Example Model Output
Machine IP OS Event Service User A Account
192.168.1.1 2 0 1 0
192.168.1.2 1 1 0 1
192.168.1.3 1 ? 0 1
Table 3.4: Example Similarity Results for Nodes on the Network
Machine IP 192.168.1.1 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3
192.168.1.1 1 -0.17408 0.301511
192.168.1.2 -0.17408 1 0.57735
192.168.1.3 0.301511 0.57735 1
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prediction(a, i) = ra +
∑
b∈N similarity(a, b) ∗ (rb,i − rb)∑
b∈N similarity(a, b)
(3.2)
Continuing with the earlier example the predicted values are shown in Table 3.5. The
prediction for the event occurring for the similar node is higher. Related to the cyber
defense domain the rational is that similar nodes will have similar vulnerabilities and
therefore similar attacks expected against them. The predicted rating for nodes are the
values used to determine vulnerabilities that the knowledge based recommender system
needs to consider when generating defensive actions.
Table 3.5: Example Predicted Value for Nodes
Machine IP OS Event Service User A Account
192.168.1.1 2 0 1 0
192.168.1.2 1 1 0 1
192.168.1.3 1 0.40693 0 1
3.4 Knowledge-based Recommender System
The knowledge based recommender system is the core element to making defensive
action recommendations. The knowledge-based recommender system paradigm chosen
is commonly referred to as a constraint-based recommender. A constraint-based
recommender system in the manner that it is implemented for the cyber defense
recommender system is a subset of knowledge-based recommender system. The
recommender system depends on pre-set knowledge about which actions mitigate or
counter which cyber attacks. It is reasonable to assume that there is a good understanding
of what actions counter certain attacks.
When the recommender system is first started it loads from an XML file all the actions
that it knows. The actions supplied by the IDS are the only ones considered for the scope
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of the experiment. The IDS and recommender system could both be expanded to include
a significantly larger set of actions, but that is not the focus of this work. The XML file
only needs to be loaded at the initial start up which leads to an expectation that the first
computation time for the recommender system should be significantly larger than the other
computation times. An example of the XML file format is shown in Figure 3.5. Each
<attack>
<defact>
<name></name>
<exploit></exploit>
</defact>
</attack>
Figure 3.5: Format example of XML file used by knowledge-base recommender system
action may counter multiple exploits. Therefore, the action suggested should mitigate
as many of the predicted attacks as possible. The recommender system presents the
top 10 actions in order of the most number of possible attacks mitigated. Currently no
consideration is given for functionally of the network, but instead leaves the decision up to
the cyber defender. If a vital node is at risk the cyber defender may chose a more dramatic
reaction, than would be chosen if a non-vital node was under attack. The intention of
suggesting 10 defensive actions is to give the cyber defender options while presenting what
the recommender system has determined to be the best defensive action up front.
The knowledge-based recommender system considers all the possible actions that can
be taken to counter the current threats. Equation (3.3) is formed where events A, B, and C
are all events associated with the specific action.The t stands for threat level and o stands
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for the occurrence of event. Once all the action values are calculated they are sorted in
descending order and presented to the cyber defender as recommendations.
value = (tA) ∗ (oA) + (tB) ∗ (oB) + (tC) ∗ (oC) (3.3)
3.5 Summary
In this chapter the design of the system used in the experiment was described in detail.
First, the inner workings of the IDS and network model were broken into parts. Second,
the collaborative recommender system algorithm was shown using an example network
model. Finally, the defensive action generation was described using the knowledge-based
recommender system algorithm.
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IV. Methodology
4.1 Problem Definition
4.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The application of recommender systems has been constrained to recommending
items of interest to users. The goal of this research is to determine the value of
employing a recommender system as an attack predictor, and determine the a configuration
of a recommender system for the cyber defense domain. Every implementation of a
recommender system must be designed to function efficiently in a given domain. The
research effort identifies the performance of five recommender system algorithms to predict
cyber attacks. It is expected that the recommender system will be a more accurate
predictor for cyber attacker actions than previously developed attack predictors. A hybrid
recommender system considers multiple aspects of the system to make a prediction, while
current attack predictors attempt to make decisions based on one dimension of the problem
domain.
4.1.2 Approach.
To determine the superior recommendation algorithm multiple types must be
observed. Hybrid recommender systems are comprised of collaborative, content-based,
and knowledge-based with different combinatorial techniques. Because of the nature of
cyber attacks, sparsity in collaborative and content-based recommender systems means
that a knowledge-based recommender must be used in the hybrid recommender. The
knowledge-based recommender is combined with a collaborative technique. Different
configurations of the recommender systems are used as an attack predictor for the same set
of cyber attacks. The accuracy of the different recommender systems will be compared.
The accuracy results of the experiment are analytically contrasted with current attack
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predictor systems to determine if the recommender system is an effective cyber defense
tool.
4.2 System Boundaries
The testing environment includes a virtual network, a host server machine, an IDS,
and the recommender system. A system overview is shown in Figure 4.1. The host server
machine is the physical machine on which the virtual network exists. The virtual network
contains multiple virtual machines running both Windows and Linux operating systems.
Within the virtual network is a black hat machine which acts as the source of the cyber
attacks. The IDS is configured to alert based on the cyber attacks used for testing [23].
The information about the network health feeds into the recommender system from the
IDS. Therefore, the IDS must be able to identify the attack to give the recommender
system correct information about the network. The recommender system includes a hybrid
configuration with a knowledge-based recommender system in addition to collaborative
techniques. The hybrid technique used is limited to cascade hybridization. Instead
of running different recommendation techniques in parallel then combining the output,
cascade uses the output of one recommendation as the input for a different technique.
4.3 System Services
The system provides the service of recommending actions for a defender to counter
the current cyber attack. The virtual machines act as users and sensors for the network.
The IDS takes in information from the virtual network and correlates alerts to identify and
classify attacks on the network. The recommender system, using domain knowledge and
information from the IDS, predicts the attacker’s next action and gives the defender an
action to counter the attacker. Possible outcomes of the network service include: (1) the
cyber attack was not successful, (2) a loss of network traffic, and (3) the cyber attack was
successful. The IDS outcomes include: (1) correctly identifying an attack, (2) incorrectly
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Figure 4.1: The Recommender Defender System
identifying attack, (3) no alert to attack, and (4) error. The recommender system outcomes
include: (1) correctly predicting the defense counteraction, (2) incorrectly predicting the
defense counteraction, and (3) error. A correct prediction of a defense attack is an action
which is appropriate for mitigating or stopping the next attack to be performed by the cyber
attacker. An error outcome includes a failure of the component or a null output from the
component. The recommender system is the focus of the experiment, therefore metrics are
deﬁned to measure these three possible outcomes. A successful outcome for the system
occurs when the recommender system presents a correct defender counteraction for the
next attacker action.
4.4 Workload
The workload for the network includes the traﬃc from the attacker machine. The
traﬃc from the attacker machine varies to include multiple attacks. For each attack the
basic attacker principles are followed show in Figure 4.2 [26, 28]. Information gathering
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1. Information Gathering - Collection of general information about the target.
2. Scanning and Vulnerability Assessment - Network scan performed to obtain infor-
mation about users and potential vulnerabilities on the network.
Nmap
3. Intrusion - Exploitation of vulnerabilities to gain access to the system.
ms08 067 netapi exploit
4. Maintaining Access - Deployment of a backdoor or other malicious software.
netcat
5. Clearing Tracks - Removal of the evidence of cyber attack.
alter register information
Figure 4.2: General cyber attacker process
does not include an attack tool, because it is usually not performed on the network directly,
but instead as a social networking attack. The attacks are from the suite of available tools
on the Linux Backtracking OS, specifically metasploit modules. Using different tools from
the metasploit framework attacks perform each step in the process. The order and types of
attacks performed is considered the workload for this system. The first attack is Nmap for
the scanning step, then ms08 067 netapi vulnerability from the metasploit modules for the
intrusion step.
4.5 Performance Metrics
The accuracy of recommender systems reveals the effectiveness of using a specific
recommender system in the cyber defense domain. The widely accepted metric used for
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recommender systems is a calculation of Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) which requires
comparison between the utility assigned by the recommender system and the true utility
of an item [11, 14]. RMSE highlights the difference in the recommendation from the true
value, which shows how well the recommender can determine the attacker’s next action.
The accuracy of the system is not the only metric of interest. It is useful to know
how long it takes for the recommender system to determine a recommendation. The speed
of recommendation calculations determines if the recommender system can have practical
applications on a real network. For a recommender system to be useful on a real network it
must be able to compute an accurate recommendation within a reasonable amount of time.
Some recommender systems perform computation oﬄine, but this is not an acceptable
solution for a cyber attack predictor [18]. The IDS performs the analysis of the system and
creates an output file which is sent to the recommender system. The computation time for
the recommender system begins when it receives the file from the IDS and ends when a
recommendation has been displayed to the defender. The time measurement includes the
processing of the IDS information into the matrix used by the recommender system. By
measuring the time from when the recommender system receives a new alert, it focuses the
metric on the recommender algorithm and is not affected by the performance of the IDS or
the virtual network.
4.6 System Parameters
The system parameters are characteristics of the system which affect the performance
of the system. The majority of these parameters are fixed.
• Configuration of client machines - The OS and the Random Access Memory (RAM)
for the machines on the network determine the services available on each machine
and the speed. The configuration influences the effectiveness of attacks. The
effectiveness of attacks are also directly related to the vulnerabilities on the user
machines which depend on the OS and service settings such as open ports.
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• Configuration of recommender system machine - The recommender system machine
configuration affects the performance of the computation speed of a suggestion for a
defender’s reaction.
• IDS Alerts - The appearance of the attacks impacts the response from the IDS. The
IDS classifies and correlates information from the virtual network to generate updates
for the recommender system. The output from the IDS is the only information
the recommender system uses to create a suggestion of defense. Depending on
what the IDS presents as output greatly affects the recommendations made by the
recommender system.
• Initial state of recommender system before execution of algorithm - The accuracy of
the recommender system depends heavily on information from the IDS, and the state
of the user-item matrix. The current information from the IDS must be added to the
user-item matrix before executing the recommender system algorithm. The user-item
matrix relates attacker actions to a specific attacker with a utility value. The utility
value ranges between 0 and 1, where 1 means the attacker used the attack and all other
values represents the likelihood the attacker will use the attack. The results from the
recommender system are limited to the potential actions given for each machine by
the IDS output.
• Implementation of recommender system algorithm - The algorithm implemented for
the recommender system affects the speed and the recommendation generated. The
type of recommender system used would return different suggestions. The two
main types of collaborative and knowledge-based recommender systems all use very
different approaches to predicting the next action of the attacker. The output of the
system depends on the implementation specifics of the hybrid recommender. The
different types of recommender systems have different computational complexity
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which depends significantly on implementation of the algorithm. Depending on
which one is implemented in the system the speed of the defender’s reaction is
significantly impacted.
Cascade Technique - Cascaded hybrid recommenders group items and then
prioritize within the groups to form an overall recommendation. The cascade
recommender algorithm must complete the first method before applying the second
method.
4.7 Factors
The factors for the system are the parameters and workload which are varied in the
experiment. The parameter which is varied for the experiment is the algorithm implemented
for the recommender system. All of the other parameters will remain constant to reveal the
effects of different recommender system algorithms in the cyber defense domain. The
factors are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Factor Levels
Level Hybridization Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2 Variation
1 Cascade Collaborative Knowledge-based Attributes no IP association
2 Cascade Collaborative Knowledge-based Threshold 0
3 Cascade Collaborative Knowledge-based Threshold 0.5
4 Cascade Collaborative Knowledge-based Threshold 0.75
5 Cascade Collaborative Knowledge-based Threshold 0.95
Different cyber attacks are executed to show how the recommender system works
in two different situations. The objective of the attack will be to compromise a specific
user machine on the network. The attacks will target a machine on the network. The
recommender system should react to protect the target machine, but depending on the
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information it has in the user-item matrix it may predict incorrectly. The cyber attacks
are scripted with different attacks which follow the basic principles of cyber methodology.
In order for the recommender system to be able to predict the attacker’s next action the
recommender system needs to understand attacker actions.
4.8 Evaluation Technique
Measurement of the virtual network is the main evaluation technique. The virtual
network functions as both a realistic network and good testing environment. Between
experiments, a virtual network snapshot can easily be taken at any stage and reverted back
to previous states.
The virtual network is located on a server with two 3.46 GHz CPU, 192.0 GBmemory,
1.8 TB disk capacity, and a VMWare ESXi hypervisor 5.0.0. The topology of the virtual
network is show in Figure 4.3. For this experiment the machine with the IDS and the
recommender is labeled “sensor”. The recommender system code is written in java and
compiled using java version 1.6.024 OpenJDK (IcedTea61.11.5) (6b24−1.11.5−0ubuntu1−
12.04.1). As stated in the previous section the system is affected by the computation speed
of machines on the network. Table 4.2 shows the OS, Central Processing Unit (CPU), the
RAM, version, and function for each of the different machines on the network. The OS
corresponds to the label given in Figure 4.3 and the values in Table 4.2 apply to all of the
machines with the same OS.
4.9 Experimental Design
A full-factorial design is implemented with five different factors. The algorithm factor
uses five different algorithms. The number of experiments is 5 and with 30 replications that
results in 150 total experiments. Considering the deterministic nature of the recommender
system the variance is very low assuming that the IDS has valid output. With such a low
variance a 95% confidence level is achieved with only 30 replications of each. A statistical
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Figure 4.3: Virtual Network Topology
Table 4.2: Conﬁguration of Virtual Machines
OS CPU RAM Version Function
Ubuntu Desktop 12 3.46 GHz 4 GB 3.2.0-27-generic-pae Sensor
Windows 7 Enterprise 32-bit 3.47 GHz 1 GB SP1 Client
Windows XP Professional 3.47 GHz 512 MB SP2 Client
Ubuntu Server 12.04 LTS 3.46 GHz 1 GB 3.2.0-23-generic-pae Sever
Windows Server 2008 64-bit Enterprise 3.47 GHz 4 GB SP1 Server
PFSense 3.46GHz 1 GB 2.0.1 Firewall
diﬀerence in the algorithm’s performance can be seen in the 95% conﬁdence interval even
at a low percentage of diﬀerence between the results. The levels chosen limit the factors to
a reasonable number of possibilities making full-factorial experiments practical.
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4.10 Summary
This chapter describes the methodology implemented to determine the effectiveness
of recommender systems as an attack predictor in the cyber defense domain. The
workload designed simulates a realistic attacker methodology following the five step
process. The parameters include the configuration of the virtual network, IDS alerts,
the state of the recommender system, and the implementation of the algorithms. The
metrics of response time and accuracy are selected to observe the factors and levels of
recommender system algorithm implementation. A virtual network is used because it
enables multiple experiments to be conducted efficiently and still represent a realistic
network. A full-factorial experimental design is shown for that measurement technique.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Overview
In this chapter the results of the previously outlined test are presented, beginning with
the metrics from the experiments, followed by the statistical analysis of the results, and
ending the chapter with the implications of the experiment’s results.
5.2 Computation Time Results
The first experiment used the recommender system algorithm where each attribute was
not directly related to the IP address. The computation time for the individual run had a
max of 1.477 seconds and a minimum of 0.03843 seconds. The mean computation time
was 0.1425 seconds with a median of 0.09689 seconds. Figure 5.2 shows the many large
outliers from the computation time, which correspond to the peaks in Figure 5.1. The first
large peak is the maximum value and can be explained by the initialization which occurs in
the first run of the algorithm. The first time the recommender system runs it must load the
attack knowledge base. After the first run of the algorithm the same knowledge base is used
for the following runs. The other peaks in the computation time in Figure 5.1 occur when
the network is under attack. The computation time for the recommender system spikes
during an attack on the network because the knowledge based recommender section of the
algorithm must determine the best response. When the network is not under attack there
are no current attacks to react to, but depending on the threshold there maybe predicted
attacks on vulnerable nodes on the network.
The next set of algorithms were run in parallel. Each was subjected to the same attacks
with only the modification of different threshold values applied. The threshold value is the
number calculated for the attack event for each node. If the predicted value is above the
threshold value that node is viewed as being attacked for the purpose of determining the
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Figure 5.1: Computation Time for Recommender System Algorithm: Attributes with no IP
association
counter action to be taken. The change in threshold value could affect the outcome of the
computation time because with more possible attacks different response actions must be
considered when the knowledge based recommender system determines the best defensive
action. In Table 5.1, the summary statistics for the four different algorithms are shown.
An ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA) test is performed on the computation times for
the five different algorithms to determine if there is a significant difference between the
computation times. The null hypothesis for the ANOVA test is that the mean computation
time is equal for all five of the algorithms. The results of the ANOVA test are shown in
Table 5.2. The outliers for the data makes a linear model questionable for the data. The very
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Figure 5.2: Computation Time for Recommender System
small p-value found for the ANOVA test shows that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
mean values. The box plots in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 support the conclusion of diﬀerent
mean values with the mean of the algorithm with attributes without IP association, with a
threshold of 0, and a threshold of 0.95 mean values that do not fall within the quartiles of
the algorithms with threshold values of 0.5 and 0.75.
5.3 Accuracy Results
The metric for determining the accuracy of the recommendation is RMSE. The
RMSE compares the predicted value calculated by the recommender system to the known
true value. Observing the speciﬁc attack performed on the Windows XP machine, the
recommender system should predict higher values for that same event occuring for other
Windows XP machines. For the purpose of these calculations the known true value for all
XP machines with the same vulnerability as the attacked machine were given a value of 1
for that attack, while all other machines were given a value of 0. The RMSE is calculated
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usingEquation(5.1).
(x−x1)2
n (5.1)
TheRMSEforvulnerablemachineswassigniﬁcantlyhigherthantheRMSEresults
fornon-vulnerablemachines.Almostalofthepredictedvalueswerecloserto0than1but
thevaluesforthevulnerablemachineswerestatisticalyhigherthanthepredictedvalues
ofthenon-vulnerablemachines. A Welchtwosamplet-testwasperformedcomparing
themeanpredictedvaluefortheatackonthesetofvulnerablemachinesandtheset
ofnon-vulnerablemachines.The Welchtwosamplet-testwasperformedonalofthe
predictedvaluesforeachoftheﬁverecommendersystemalgorithms. Theresultsof
theWelcht-testfortherecommendersystemwithoutatributeassociationwasap-value
<2.2x10−16.whichissigniﬁcantlylessthanthealphavalueof0.05.The95%conﬁdence
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interval was between 0.06518022 and 0.09284223, which does not include 0 meaning that
there is a difference in the mean values of the two sets of data. The mean of the vulnerable
machines is at 0.12805207 and the mean of the non-vulnerable machines is at 0.04904085,
therefore the mean of the predicted values of the event for vulnerable machines is higher
than the mean for the non-vulnerable machines. The p-value is the same for all of the
algorithms, therefore the conclusions hold true for all of the algorithms tested and are
summarized in Table 5.3. Notched boxplots support these conclusions shown in Figure 5.8,
and Figure 5.9. All of the notched boxplots do not have overlapping notches which is strong
statistically evidence that the means are different for the vulnerable and non-vulnerable
predicted values. The notches are calculated using Equation (5.2), which is based off of
the same computations used for t-tests. With statistically higher values it shows that the
recommender system did predict that those vulnerable machines were possible targets for
a similar cyber attack.
1.58 ∗ IQR√
n
(5.2)
Table 5.1: Computation Time of Algorithms with Varied Threshold Values
Threshold Minimum 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Maximum
0 0.04176 sec 0.1019 sec 0.1115 sec 0.2565 sec 0.2798 sec 3.548 sec
0.5 0.04153 sec 0.1480 sec 0.2497 sec 0.3392 sec 0.4181 sec 2.850 sec
0.75 0.04184 sec 0.1756 sec 0.2823 sec 0.4464 sec 0.5546 sec 3.236 sec
0.95 0.04121 sec 0.1020 sec 0.1301 sec 0.3146 sec 0.3623 sec 3.538 sec
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Table 5.2: The results of the ANOVA test on the computation times for the five algorithms
Degrees of Freedom Sum Sq Mean Sq F-value Pr(>F)
group 4 5.7361x1018 1.4340x1018 12.711 4.579x10−10
Residuals 895 1.0097x1020 1.1282x1017
Figure 5.4: Computation Time for Recommender System Algorithm: Threshold Value 0
The recommender system algorithm gave the responses to the netbios attack shown
in Table 5.7. There were slight deviations from these responses for each of the five
algorithms. The first recommendation was made based on the fact that the knowledge-based
recommender system determined that it covered the largest number of threats to the
network. The number of threats could change based on the threshold value for each
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Figure 5.5: Computation Time for Recommender System Algorithm: Threshold Value 0.5
Table 5.3: Welch Two Sample T-test Comparing Vulnerable and Non-vulnerable Machines
Algorithm Confidence Interval Mean of Vulnerable Mean of Non-Vulnerable
No Attribute Association 0.065-0.0927 0.127 0.049
Threshold 0 0.072-0.093 0.151 0.068
Threshold 0.5 0.140-0.160 0.151 0.001
Threshold 0.75 0.146-0.162 0.157 0.003
Threshold 0.95 0.145-0.160 0.156 0.003
algorithm. The predicted values for each other vulnerable node was so low they were
only included in the algorithm with a threshold value of 0.
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Figure 5.6: Computation Time for Recommender System Algorithm: Threshold Value 0.75
Comparing the recommendations given by each algorithm to the correct cyber
response showed 100% correct selection of actions with varied calculated threat levels. For
the purpose of these experiments the firewall rule is the correct cyber defense response
from the knowledge base that was given to the recommender system. The correct
recommendation was generated, but only of the attacks that were above the threshold.
The recommender system algorithm with attributes not associated with IP addresses
resulted in the same 45 of 47 recommended actions with all 47 recommendations listed
having the same first response of a firewall rule to block the source IP address. The
defensive actions are shown in Table 5.8 which shows that the algorithm found vulnerable
machines and recommended a defensive action to resolve the threat.
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Figure 5.7: Computation Time for Recommender System Algorithm: Threshold Value 0.95
Based on predicted values for vulnerable machines centering around 0.2 the threshold
values for the algorithms should be adjusted. Three more algorithms were tested with
threshold values of 0.15, 0.18, and 0.2. The recommendations for the thresholds of
0.15, 0.18, and 0.2 identified more threats and addressed them appropriately. The
recommendations are show in Table 5.9. The first recommendation of creating a firewall
rule, addresses the threat for all vulnerable machines. The following recommendations
suggests updating the OS for each vulnerable machine. For the threshold of 0.15, 37 of the
93 total recommended lists alerted to all 6 of the vulnerable machines and gave the correct
recommendation. For the threshold of 0.18, 29 of the 88 total recommended lists alerted to
all 6 of the vulnerable machines and gave the correct recommendation. For the threshold of
0.2, only 4 of the 93 total recommended list alerted to all 6 of the vulnerable machines and
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Figure 5.8: Algorithm Attributes with no IP association
gave the correct recommendation. With a lower threshold there were some false positives,
meaning that non-vulnerable machines were identified as vulnerable machines. The break
down of false positives, true positives, false negatives, and true negatives are shown in
Figure 5.10, Figure 5.11, and Figure 5.12. Overall, a threshold of 0.15 appears to be the
best choice for the algorithm.
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Figure 5.9: Algorithm All Threshold Values
5.4 Implications
The attack prediction algorithm was not as revealing as expected, but correct
actions were generated from weak predictions. With the adjusted threshold values the
recommendations improved significantly. At the same time the prediction results reveal
that more work needs to be done in this area. While, the computation time for a reasonably
sized network was on the order of millisecond with the longest time reaching only 3.5
seconds. The computation time shows the recommender system is a viable tool for network
security. The computation time for all of the algorithms are impacted by running on a
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Figure 5.10: Algorithm Threshold Value 0.15
virtual machine sharing resources on the ESXi server. If the algorithm ran on a dedicated
physical machine it would run within reasonable time constraints.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter the computation time results were presented. The metrics for accuracy
were shown and analyzed. The implications for the data concluded that the recommender
system is a valuable tool for cyber defense, but requires refinement.
54
Figure 5.11: Algorithm Threshold Value 0.18
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Figure 5.12: Algorithm Threshold Value 0.2
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Table 5.4: Root Mean Squared Error
IP address True Value RMSE Attributes not associated by IP
192.168.1.6 0 0.00079
192.168.1.8 0 0.00052
192.168.1.9 0 0.00115
192.168.1.10 0 0.04348
192.168.1.11 0 0.00389
192.168.1.12 0 0.01872
192.168.1.13 0 0.00462
192.168.1.14 0 0.01872
192.168.1.15 0 0.00464
192.168.1.16 0 0.00156
192.168.1.17 0 0.02656
192.168.1.18 0 0.00118
192.168.1.19 0 0.00102
192.168.1.21 0 0.00340
192.168.1.23 1 0.84271
192.168.1.24 1 0.94085
192.168.1.25 1 0.88309
192.168.1.26 1 0.87494
192.168.1.27 1 0.86616
192.168.1.28 1 0.85244
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Table 5.5: Root Mean Squared Error
IP address True Value RMSE Threshold 0 RMSE Threshold 0.5
192.168.1.6 0 0.00923 0.007414
192.168.1.8 0 0.00478 0.00438
192.168.1.9 0 0.00196 0.00227
192.168.1.10 0 0.10993 0.04345
192.168.1.11 0 0.00602 0.00324
192.168.1.12 0 0.00056 0.00065
192.168.1.13 0 0.00604 0.00424
192.168.1.14 0 0.00216 0.00279
192.168.1.15 0 0.00296 0.00380
192.168.1.16 0 0.00451 0.00049
192.168.1.17 0 0.00095 0.00110
192.168.1.18 0 0.00328 0.00500
192.168.1.19 0 0.00261 0.00057
192.168.1.21 0 0.00100 0.00122
192.168.1.23 1 0.85319 0.83878
192.168.1.24 1 0.86101 0.89111
192.168.1.25 1 0.86075 0.86134
192.168.1.26 1 0.85166 0.83917
192.168.1.27 1 0.84098 0.84757
192.168.1.28 1 0.85220 0.83877
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Table 5.6: Root Mean Squared Error
IP address True Value RMSE Threshold 0.75 RMSE Threshold 0.95
192.168.1.6 0 0.00917 0.00944
192.168.1.8 0 0.00508 0.00525
192.168.1.9 0 0.00218 0.00525
192.168.1.10 0 0.10360 0.10585
192.168.1.11 0 0.00433 0.00484
192.168.1.12 0 0.00059 0.00059
192.168.1.13 0 0.00644 0.00642
192.168.1.14 0 0.00233 0.00223
192.168.1.15 0 0.00315 0.00290
192.168.1.16 0 0.00425 0.00465
192.168.1.17 0 0.00100 0.00116
192.168.1.18 0 0.00350 0.00338
192.168.1.19 0 0.00277 0.00268
192.168.1.21 0 0.00106 0.00131
192.168.1.23 1 0.84758 0.84751
192.168.1.24 1 0.86430 0.85682
192.168.1.25 1 0.84276 0.85681
192.168.1.26 1 0.84693 0.84678
192.168.1.27 1 0.83187 0.83537
192.168.1.28 1 0.84448 0.84736
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Table 5.7: Recommended Cyber Defense Action
Rank Action Threat Level
1 Firewall Rule Block Source IP Address of Attack 1
2 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.22 1
3 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.23 0
4 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.24 0
5 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.25 0
6 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.26 0
7 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.27 0
8 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.28 0
9 Update Application 0
10 Disable Port 0
Table 5.8: Recommended Cyber Defense Action
Rank Action Threat Level
1 Firewall Rule Block Source IP Address of Attack 1
2 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.22 1
3 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.23 1
4 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.24 1
5 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.25 1
6 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.26 1
7 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.27 1
8 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.28 1
9 Update Application 0
10 Disable Port 0
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Table 5.9: Recommended Cyber Defense Action
Rank Action Threat Level
1 Firewall Rule Block Source IP Address of Attack 6
2 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.22 1
3 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.23 1
4 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.24 1
5 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.25 1
6 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.26 1
7 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.27 1
8 Update Operating System for 192.168.1.28 1
9 Update Application 0
10 Disable Port 0
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VI. Conclusion
6.1 Overview
This chapter highlights the results and the contributions of this research effort. Finally,
suggested future work is presented.
6.2 Results
The results for the experiment looked at computation time and accuracy. The
computation time for the algorithm fell on the order of seconds for the maximum and
milliseconds for the average time. The recommendations of defensive actions gave the
correct order of responses. The predicted values from the collaborative recommender
system algorithm had large residuals when compared to the actual values. Even with
weak prediction values the recommender system algorithm was able to present the defense
actions that mitigated the cyber attack.
6.3 Contribution
The most important contribution of this research effort was the use of recommender
systems to generate an ordered list of cyber defense actions. The test bed created for this
research can be used for future work. The IDS has been fully incorporated for all the
machines on the network. The size of the network makes any research performed on the
test bed network applicable to most real networks. Even very large enterprise networks
could be defended using the backbone of the network as nodes instead of all the machines.
6.4 Future Work
The recommender system did not appear to be significantly more insightful compared
to other attack predictors. With so many different recommender system algorithms in
existence, more algorithms need to be explored to determine their value as a cyber defense
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tool. The value of using a recommender system as a cyber defense tool is the resulting
list of recommended actions. Instead of building a purely recommender system attack
predictor and action recommendation creator, a recommender system could be used to
augment a current attack predictor to generate a list of recommended actions. At the same
time recommender systems hold the potential to be a very useful attack predictor but needs
more development.
Instead of using the collaborative technique for making recommendations a content-
based approach could be taken. A recommender system to utilize information from dif-
ferent attackers with different styles viewing the attackers then comparing them to known
archetypes of attackers in order to predict their future attacks should be built. The attacker
would be the customer and the attack is an item. The recommender system would cal-
culate a rating for other attacks, acting as an attack predictor. Based on the prediction a
recommended list of actions can be generated.
Using some of the same recommender system algorithms from this research should be
further explored by focusing on the knowledge-base. The knowledge-base could easily be
expanded which may lead to more insightful recommendations. The next step would be to
add a learning aspect to the algorithm where it builds on the knowledge-base by viewing
how certain attacks are mitigated depending on the cyber defense action which is executed.
The similarity calculation performed by the recommender system could be very valuable
but more work should be done to focus on key attributes of each machine on the network.
The IDS provided a wide range of attributes, some of which should be given more weight
than others instead of the flat consideration given by the algorithms in this research effort.
With more refinement, a better attack predictor can be developed.
6.5 Summary
This research has shown that a recommender system can be used as an attack predictor
and cyber defense tool. The results show that a recommended list of cyber defense actions
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can be quickly and accurately presented to the cyber warrior. The recommender system and
tests designed act as a foundation for more exploration into using recommender systems in
the cyber domain. There are many opportunities for continuing work in this area of study.
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